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Net Impacts of Active Labor Programs in Hungary and Poland
Christopher J. O'Leary, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
While they have adopted somewhat different macroeconomic strategies for the transition 
to a market economy, the central European nations of Hungary and Poland have pursued quite 
similar policies for labor market support. To ease economic hardship and facilitate labor 
redeployment during the economic restructuring, the governments of these countries provide 
unemployment compensation (UC) and a variety of active labor programs (ALPs).
This report reports on a net impact evaluation of the most widely used ALPs in Hungary 
and Poland. The analysis relies on extensive person level data gathered through large follow-up 
surveys of nationally representative samples of ALP participants and comparison group members 
conducted during the first two quarters of 1997. Four types of ALP are examined in this study. 
They are: retraining, public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment assistance.
The analysis examines results for each of the alternative programs using the same 
measures of success: reemployment, earnings, and conservation of UC funds. It may be unfair to 
assess public works from these perspectives since the prime objectives of direct job creation are 
income transfer, arresting the deterioration of work place behaviors, and some contribution to 
public infrastructure or services. Nonetheless, looking at a group of ALPs all at once with the 
same methodology on the same outcomes informs policy makers about the implicit trade-offs 
involved when choosing among alternate programs. The findings in Hungary and Poland have 
been useful in reshaping policy in those counties. Sharing the findings and evaluation process
may help improve policy and practice in other economies coping with dramatic changes in the 
labor market.
Related research
i Some previous investigations of ALP effectiveness in Hungary and Poland during the 
transition period have focused on aggregate effects. For example, Boeri (1997) found that 
aggregate ALP spending and participation increased the rate of outflow from unemployment 
registers of the public employment service to jobs in Poland but not in Hungary.
Puhani and Steiner (1996) used a small sample of ALP participants taken from the 
August 1994 supplement to the quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS) in Poland and found no 
significant effects of aggregate ALP expenditure on unemployment, and that public works is 
better regarded as an income transfer scheme than as a means of achieving reemployment in a 
non-subsidized job. They also suggest that the social dividend from ALP spending in Poland 
could be improved by targeting services to people with identifiable barriers to reemployment. 
Using the same August 1994 LFS micro data Puhani (1996) found that retraining in Poland did 
not improve reemployment prospects, but rather served mainly as an income transfer program.
There have been some gross outcome estimates done for self-employment assistance. 
Based on a survey conducted in two Hungarian counties, Frey (1994) estimated that 72.9 percent 
of people who received self-employment assistance from the Hungarian Labor Fund in 1992 
continued in some type of self-employment at least six months after assistance stopped. There 
has been no previous examination of self-employment assistance from the Polish labor fund, but 
the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (1996) reported on the use of Entrepreneurship
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Development Funds (EDFs) set up within small business assistance centers. 1 In the years 1994 
to 1996 there were 390 loans given from EDFs. These loans resulted in 779 jobs, or about two 
jobs per loan. The mean loan amount was US$4,544 or about US$ 2,275 per job created.
Using person level survey data on participants in retraining, public service employment 
(PSE), and a comparison group in Hungary gathered in 1992 and 1993 Godfrey, Lazar and 
O'Leary (1993) and O'Leary (1997) found a significant degree of non-random assignment to 
ALP participation. While gross impact estimates suggested a nearly 20 percentage point gain in 
reemployment rates after retraining, adjusting for observable characteristics the net impact 
estimates indicated gains on the order of only 6 percentage points. Selection bias was found to 
be less of a problem in the PSE analysis with program participation lowering reemployment rates 
by an estimated 15 percentage points.
To date there has been no investigation of wage subsidy type programs in these countries. 
However after examining policy alternatives for countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Jackman (1994) concluded that wage subsidies and self-employment are practical ways to 
address unemployment, because these interventions stimulate labor demand without upsetting 
other aspects of the economic restructuring process.
'Entrepreneurship Development Funds (EDFs) were set up within small business 
assistance centers (SBACs) as part of the World Bank employment project to actively combat 
unemployment. Each EDF received an initial endowment from the project, and that money was 
intended to act as a seed which would be replenished and grow through loan repayments, interest 
collections, and supplements received from local governmental agencies (Mazewska, 1996). 
There were 42 SBACs in Poland by the end of 1996 (Kaszuba, 1996).
Context of the evaluations
Since 1990, both Hungary and Poland have experienced dramatic declines in gross 
domestic product and increases in unemployment. Table 1 shows how the registered 
unemployment rate changed during the first seven years of rapid transition to markets.
In Hungary the unemployment rate rose from nothing in 1990 to a peak of 13.4 percent in 
1993 when 705,000 were registered as unemployed job seekers in February. Unemployment 
now is slightly below 10 percent largely due to a rise in inactivity; the labor force having shrunk 
by more than a million workers.2
Unemployment in Poland changed in parallel with that in Hungary. It jumped from zero 
in 1989 to 16.4 percent in 1993. The registered unemployment rate in Poland has only recently 
dipped below 13 percent. Labor force withdrawal in Poland has been dampened by the 
entitlement to national health insurance which is provided by registration with a local labor office 
as an unemployed job seeker.
The transition to a market economy has required relaxed price controls and reduced state 
subsidies. These changes combined with the loss of COMECON trading partners resulted in 
increased unemployment, rising consumer prices, large public budget deficits, and growing 
foreign trade debts. These developments have prompted international monetary authorities to 
require ever greater restraint in public spending. Nonetheless, the employment policies pursued
2K6'116, Lazar, Nagy and Szekely (1995) provide evidence from a survey of UC 
exhaustees that the decline in Hungarian unemployment was achieved in part through withdrawal 
from the labor force mainly by women, and the proliferation of non-reported employment mainly 
among men.
in both countries have been impressive, but demonstration of programme effectiveness is crucial 
to continued funding.
Since January 1994 an extensive system of performance indicators for monitoring cost- 
effectiveness of ALPs has been used throughout Hungary.3 A similar system was developed for 
Poland, and has been used in some areas of the country since 1996. These systems measure 
program effectiveness in terms of the results achieved.4 They track gross program outcomes 
such as reemployment rates and the average cost of achieving reemployment, using data from 
follow-up mail surveys of program participants.
When program managers are encouraged to achieve a high employment rate for program 
participants, a phenomenon called creaming frequently results.5 That is, program managers 
might select mainly the most able applicants for participation. The result is high observed 
reemployment rates, however many of the selected ALP participants may already possess the 
skills and abilities to get reemployed themselves. By comparing their success to all unemployed,
3O'Leary (1995) described implementation of the system in Hungary and plans for use of 
a similar system in Poland as a tool for managing ALPs.
4Auer (1996) documents the use of such systems for employment programs among 
countries in the European Union. The OECD (1994) provided a guide on how to use such a 
system for program management. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) provided a 
constructive assessment of performance management systems used for employment programs in 
the United States.
5The analogy is to milk where the richest part, the cream, floats to the top and can be 
skimmed off. Creaming is an issue in operating labor market programs because if only the most 
able people get reemployment assistance, then the benefit to society of the programs is not as 
great as it might be otherwise. Highly qualified program entrants have a good chance of 
becoming reemployed even without the services offered in the program, while for less qualified 
applicants the program services might be the only realistic path to employment.
the positive impact on reemployment is high, but comparing their success to others with similar 
characteristics the program impacts may be much smaller.
Program managers were warned about the social cost of creaming in program assignment 
when the performance monitoring system was implemented in Hungary. They were encouraged 
to target ALP services to the most difficult to reemploy.6 An earlier evaluation of retraining in 
Hungary found evidence of creaming in program assignment (O'Leary, 1997). Attention is 
given in this report to assessing the degree to which creaming is now being practiced.
Since they are widely recorded on a continuous basis, the performance indicators results 
are useful for ongoing program management and planning. However, these indicators cannot 
inform policy makers about any added value which may be provided by ALPs. For such net 
impact analyses a comparison group design is needed. Net impact evaluations done from time to 
time help policy makers decide which programs to expand, modify or delete as economic and 
political conditions change. Such periodic evaluations are a necessary adjunct to performance 
monitoring based management systems, and are useful in helping to set targets for program 
performance.
An overview of employment policy
Employment policy in Hungary and Poland is carried out through administration of both 
active and passive labor programs. In both countries local labor offices serve as one stop 
shopping centers which provide an array of services to both job seekers and employers. In
6 O'Leary (1996) documented the risk of creaming in ALP performance management 
systems, and measures to counteract creaming through targeting of services.
addition to providing placement services, local labor offices act as a unified clearing house for 
referral to a variety of active and passive labor programs.
The main passive labor program in both countries is unemployment compensation (UC), 
which is available for a limited duration to unemployed workers with sufficient recent work 
1 experience. In Hungary UC had a wage replacement rate of between 50 and 75 percent of lost 
wages depending on the duration of benefit receipt which has a maximum of 12 months.7 
Hungary also provides unemployment assistance (UA) which is a means tested income support 
program paying a uniform monthly stipend pegged to 80 percent of the lowest monthly public 
retirement pension for a maximum of 24 months. Passive labor programs in Poland are limited 
to UC, which is available for up to 12 months to unemployed workers with sufficient recent work 
experience.8 The monthly UC benefit payment in Poland is uniformly 36 percent of the national 
average wage for persons with between 5 and 20 years prior work experience. The benefit is 20 
percent lower for those with under 5 years work history, and 20 percent higher for those having 
worked more than 20 years. In Poland, after exhaustion of the UC benefit, there is only the 
means-tested general assistance available from local government agencies.
As can be seen in Table 1, total spending on ALPs and unemployment compensation 
(UC) in Hungary for 1996 amounted to nearly 77.2 billion Hungarian forints or around $454.1 
million U.S. This level is about 1.03 percent of the Hungary's gross national product. In recent 
years the share of employment program expenditures devoted to ALPs has ranged from 21.8 to
7Micklewright and Nagy (1998) examined the rules and operation of UC in Hungary. In 
1998 there is now a uniform 65 percent wage replacement rate.
8G6ra and Schmidt (1998) explain the rules and effects of UC in Poland.
25.5 percent. The remainder of public spending for employment programs goes to passive labor 
support through UC and UA. About a million people use Hungary's labor programs each year 
with almost 30 percent of them participating in an ALP.
Total spending on ALPs and unemployment compensation (UC) for 1996 in Poland was 
almost 7.5 billion Polish zloty, or around $2.5 billion U.S. That amount represented nearly 
2.2 percent of the nation's gross domestic product. About 14 percent of employment program 
expenditures have supported ALPs in recent years, with the balance spent on UC. About 3 
million people per year use Poland's labor programs, with nearly a quarter of them participating 
in an ALP.
ALPs evaluated in Hungary
Retraining in Hungary provides short term job skill training to promote readiness for job 
vacancies in the region. Retraining candidates may be either unemployed, expected to be 
unemployed, currently involved in PSE, or recent school graduates. Retraining participants 
receive a stipend which is 10 percent more than their UC benefit. The direct costs of retraining 
are also paid for by the local labor office. The evaluation reported on here focused on retraining 
of the unemployed, initiated either by individuals or for groups of persons selected by local 
labor offices. Our samples of participants include recent school graduates.
Public service employment (PSE) is a short term direct job creation program with 
employment on projects organized by government agencies including municipal governments. 
Participation in PSE may last no more than 12 months. Up to 70 percent of the direct 
employment costs (including wages, work tools, working clothes, and transport) are subsidized
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by the Employment Fund, provided that the employer does not receive any net income from 
providing these items.
A wage subsidy program in Hungary is targeted toward people who are long term 
unemployed. A wage subsidy of up to 50 percent is possible for up to one year. The payment is 
made directly to the employer and applies to total labor costs for hiring persons who were; 
previously unemployed for more than 6 months (3 months for school leavers), provided the 
employer has not laid off anyone involved in the same line of work in the previous 6 months. If 
workers hired through the subsidy are not retained after the subsidy ends for a period at least as 
long as the subsidy was paid, the employer must repay the Employment Fund for all assistance 
provided.
Self-employment assistance is provided to a small fraction of persons who are eligible for 
unemployment compensation. The assistance operates like the British enterprise allowance 
scheme which gives a series of periodic support payments.9 In Hungary monthly payments are 
equal to the regular UC benefit, but may extend 6 months beyond the UC one year eligibility 
period. Support may also include reimbursement of up to half the cost of professional 
entrepreneurship counseling, and half the cost of training courses required for engaging in the 
entrepreneurial activity. Up to half the premium on loan insurance for funds borrowed to start 
the enterprise may be paid for one year.
9The British model is also used in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. Elias and Whitfield (1987) studied the 
impacts of the U.K. enterprise allowance scheme.
ALPs evaluated in Poland
In retraining, unemployed workers are given additional short-term job skill training to 
make them ready to fill local job openings. Retraining participants receive a stipend which has a 
15 percent premium over the UC benefit.
Public works is a short-term direct job creation program with employment on projects 
organized by government agencies, including municipal governments. Stipends are set at 75 
percent of the national average wage, which is more than double the 36 percent paid to UC 
recipients. The wage level makes clear the main aim of public works which is income transfer. 
Secondary aims of the program are to maintain job readiness skills of the unemployed and to 
contribute to the public health and infrastructure.
Intervention works projects may not compete with private companies and the wage paid 
by grants can be no more than the unemployment compensation benefit. Projects may be 
operated by either public agencies or private companies. There may be no intervention works 
contracts given to employers who have laid off significant numbers of workers in recent months. 
There are also incentives for employers to permanently retain workers. After the end of an 
intervention works project, which may last up to 6 months, employers can receive wage subsidies 
up to 150 percent of the national average wage for up to 6 additional months for workers retained 
after the first 6 months. Intervention works operates essentially as a wage subsidy program.
Self-employment assistance in Poland is something like the French lump sum model 
except that repayment is required. 10 Assistance is provided to a select small fraction of registered
10The French model is also followed in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden.
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unemployed through a loan program. The maximum loan is rather small, with the size limit 
being 20 times the national average wage. Loans are made at market rates of interest and must 
be repaid immediately in full if the planned enterprise is not initiated. A strong incentive for 
business survival is provided by a 50 percent reduction of the original principal amount granted 
to businesses which survive at least two years.
Evaluation methodology
In terms of clearly guiding policy, simple unadjusted impact estimates are usually the 
most influential because they are easy to understand. This is the main appeal of program 
evaluation done ushig a classically designed experiment involving random assignment. 11 When 
random assignment has been achieved, modeling of behaviour and complex econometric 
methods are not needed to estimate reliable net program impacts. With large samples randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two 
groups should not differ on average so that any difference in outcomes may be attributed to 
exposure to the program. Program impacts may be computed as the simple difference between 
means of the samples of program participants and control group members on outcome measures 
of interest.
When there is non-random assignment to either the ALP participant group or the 
comparison group from the population of unemployed job seekers then statistical methods of
HFor examples of employment programs evaluated using a classically designed field 
experiment see Decker and O'Leary (1995).
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correction must be used to reveal the net impacts of ALPs. 12 That is, proper estimation of 
program net impacts involves correcting for possible selection bias which is present if persons 
entering ALPs are on average different from comparison group members in their job skills and 
aptitude. 13 In this study adjustments for selection bias are based on observable factors for which 
data is available. 14
Recent surveys of microeconomic evaluations of ALPs done by Fay (1996) for 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries and by 
Meager and Evans (1998) for a selected group of nations emphasize the importance of 
accounting for deadweight loss and displacement effects in measuring program impacts. With a 
mixed bag of findings which reveal net impacts of different ALPs vary widely by population 
sub-group, both surveys argue that targeting of services is crucial to maximizing the social 
dividend from public expenditure on employment programs.
12Such methods are sometimes called quasi-experimental because they attempt to 
statistically mimic the ideal of a true experiment based on random trials (Fay, 1996).
13Program impacts reported in this report were estimated in models like the following: 
Yi = ao + b,ALPj + b2ESj + b3ALPj *ES; + CXj + iij,
where ALP represents participation in an ALP, ES (employment service) represents use of ES 
assistance, X represents a matrix of exogenous control variables, y is the outcome of interest, and 
u is a normally distributed mean zero error term. After estimating an equation of this form by 
ordinary least squares regression, the marginal effect of the ALP on y is estimated by the sum of 
bj + b3 *E(ES), where E is the expectation operator and E(ES) is the mean of the variable ES or 
the proportion of the sample which used the ES.
14The obvious next step to adjust for differences across samples is to account for 
differences in unobservable characteristics using the methods of Heckman (1976). An effort to 
do this failed essentially because no instruments were available which explained program 
participation independent of reemployment success.
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When an unemployed person participates in an ALP which does not improve their chance 
of reemployment there is a deadweight loss to society for the spending. 15 When an ALP 
participant gains reemployment at the direct expense of an otherwise similar job seeker then 
displacement has occurred. When an employer, either government or private, receives a subsidy 
to hire a worker who would have otherwise been hired anyway then substitution of ALP 
financing for other intended spending has occurred. 16
It is crucial to account for displacement and substitution effects when doing social 
benefit-cost assessments of public programs. However, these factors are irrelevant at the 
individual level and very difficult to measure at the social level. The investigation summarized 
here focused on net impacts of ALPs, and the comparison group design automatically accounts 
for possible deadweight loss by comparing ALP participants to otherwise similar non- 
participants. A subgroup analysis of net impacts provides a basis for targeting ALPs.
Sampling considerations
Sample sizes were set to ensure precision based on considerations of power tests for 
observing effects of a size that would be of interest to policy makers. That is, the samples were 
set to be large enough to reject the null hypothesis of no effect with sufficient power to accept the 
alternative that an intervention is efficacious. Furthermore, the sample sizes were set large
15If a program manager practices creaming in selecting participants for ALPs, then a 
deadweight loss results.
16Johnson and Tomola (1977) provide a clear example of how to estimate the 
employment effects of fiscal substitution in direct job creation programs. They maintain that the 
degree of substitution increases as a program matures.
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enough to provide reliable estimates of differential program effects on important demographic 
and regional sub-groups. The main program outcome guiding sample size determination was the 
proportion employed on the survey date, and samples sizes were set large enough to detect 
program impacts of 5 percentage points or more where the difference is measured from 50 
percent. 17
Samples were drawn from among those registered as unemployed. This is the relevant 
population from which to sample when evaluating public reemployment efforts. All recipients of 
income support and reemployment assistance from the system of labor offices must be registered 
as unemployed and seeking work. This sampling frame includes a broad cross-section of all 
unemployed job seekers since private employment agencies serve a very small segment of the 
labor market in these countries.
Samples for the evaluation in Hungary
The sample for analysis in Hungary was drawn from randomly selected samples in a 
strategically selected group of 10 counties: Budapest (the capital city), Baranya, Bekes, Borsod,
17Testing the difference between proportions is somewhat complicated by the fact that the 
sample sizes required for properly testing a given difference between proportions varies 
depending on whether the proportions are near zero or one (Cohen, 1988, pp. 179-213). 
Specifically, the required sample sizes for testing the difference in proportions with adequate 
power depend on the effect size, h, which is the difference in the arcsin transformation of the 
proportions. That is, f(p) = 2arcsin p and the effect size is h = abs(f(pp) - f(pc)) for non- 
directional tests where pp is the proportion employed among the ALP participant group and pc is 
the proportion employed among the comparison group. For tests of abs(pp - pc) = 0.05 when pp 
is around 0.5 then h = 0.1. To perform two tailed tests at the confidence level of 98 percent with 
a power of 80 percent and h = 0.1 the harmonic mean of the sample sizes should be at least 2,007 
in size, where the harmonic mean, n', of the samples sizes is n1 = 2npnc/(np + r^). Lowering the 
confidence level to 90 percent lowers the sample size requirement to 1,237. When pp is closer to 
either 0 or 1 the sample size requirements for similar tests [abs(pp - pc) = 0.05] are smaller.
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Csongrad, Fejer, Hajdu-Bihar, Pest, Szabolcs, and Vas. 18 In 1996 these counties spanned the 
range of economic conditions. Three counties enjoyed an unemployment rate below 8 percent, 
three suffered unemployment rates in excess of 15 percent, and four had moderate 
unemployment rates. Together the counties surveyed in Hungary comprise nearly two-thirds of 
the nation's population. Compared to the nation as a whole these counties have a somewhat 
smaller proportion of employment in agriculture, a higher population density, a lower 
unemployment rate, and higher mean monthly wages. Among these counties, some have 
experienced steady labor market improvement since the peak of national unemployment in early 
1993, while others have stagnated.
Administration of the surveys in Hungary was managed by experts in the National Labor 
Center. Surveys were conducted in March and April 1997 through house-to-house visits by staff 
of local labor offices during their off-work hours. 19 Program participant groups were drawn from 
the outflow of program participation occurring in the second quarter of 1996. There was random 
sampling from the outflow where sample sizes were large enough, with random draws made by 
birth date. For self-employment which had a small number of participants, an attempt was made 
to contact the full population of all those who participated during the first three quarters of 1996. 
The comparison group was randomly selected, using birth dates, in the 10 counties from the
18 The sub-national provincial divisions in Hungary are called counties and in Poland are 
called voivods.
19Some interviews were conducted during regular visits by the unemployed to labor 
offices. This survey process means ALP impact estimates on reemployment rates may be biased 
downward since the unemployed are more likely to visit labor offices, and the employed are less 
likely to be available at home during house-to-house visits.
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inflow to the register during the second quarter of 1995. That was judged to be about the time 
that most people drawn for the participant samples had themselves registered as unemployed.
Table 2 contrasts the comparison group and the ALP samples from Hungary using 
categorical indicators of sample characteristics. Sample sizes are provided in the bottom row.20 
In this table asterisks indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between the« 
comparison group and the ALP group on the characteristic. A quick glance at the table reveals 
that a large proportion of the differences are statistically significant. Indeed many more than 10 
percent of the differences are statistically significant, which is the proportion that would be 
expected if the samples were all drawn from the same population and tests at the 90 percent 
confidence level were applied.
In contrast to the comparison group which was randomly drawn from the unemployment 
register; the individual retraining sample is more female, younger, and more educated; the group 
retraining sample is also more female, younger, and more educated; the PSE sample is more 
male, younger, and less educated; the wage subsidy sample is somewhat more educated; and the 
self-employment sample is more male, closer on average to prime working age, and more 
educated.
The wide ranging differences in sample composition suggest that there was non-random 
assignment of participants to ALPs. This means that ALP net impact estimates must be 
computed while controlling for systematic sample selection. In this report correction in
20In Hungary the survey response rate among ALP participants was 81.4 percent, while 
that for the comparison group was 75.6 percent.
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estimation is limited to adjustments based on observable characteristics. 21 The estimation 
methodology used and the comparison group design purges the net impact estimates from the 
effects of any creaming practiced by program administrators.22
Samples for the evaluation in Poland :
Data for evaluating ALPs in Poland was gathered by surveys of randomly selected 
participant samples and strategically selected comparison samples in a group of eight voivods: 
Gorzow, Katowice, Konin, Krakow, Lublin, Olsztyn, Poznan, and Radom. While these locations 
were chosen partly because of information processing similarities, they nonetheless span the 
range of labor market experience in Poland during the transition to markets.23 Among the eight 
voivods surveyed, four are among Poland's most populous: Katowice, Krakow, Lublin, and 
Poznan. The eight encompass over one-quarter of the population of Poland, including several 
large cities, yielding a higher than average population density. These areas also have 
unemployment rates much lower, wages somewhat higher, and a smaller share of agriculture than 
the nation as a whole.
21 O'Leary (1998a, 1998b) presents impact estimates computed by matched pairs and a 
variety of regression methods. The various net impact estimation methods yielded estimates 
which were not significantly different from one another. The estimates presented in this report 
were all computed using an ordinary least squares regression model which controls for 
observable characteristics and for use of particular ES assistance.
22When creaming is practiced, gross impact estimates which compare participant success 
to all unemployed yield positive impacts on reemployment, while net impact estimates which 
compare participant success to others having similar characteristics would yield much smaller 
program impacts.
23A dozen different local labor office computer systems were in use around Poland at the 
time of the survey. Two different systems were involved in the eight voivods surveyed.
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Surveys were conducted in 80 local areas between February 15 and April 15, 1997. 
Administration of the questionnaires was managed by experts in the voivod labor offices and 
conducted by staff of local labor offices. Some interviews were done during regular visits to 
labor offices by subjects who had previously been selected, other interviews were done during 
house-to-house visits. The overall survey response rate was 92.6 percent.
ALP entry during the whole of 1995 was taken as the sampling frame for participants in 
retraining, public works, and intervention works. Random sampling of participants was done by 
birth date. Since a longer period is required to assess the effects of self-employment assistance, 
loan receipt during 1993 and 1994 was taken as the sampling frame. The small numbers 
involved meant that instead of random sampling from self-employment participants, an attempt 
was made to contact the whole population of assistance recipients. For other programs, sample 
sizes for each voivod were set to be in proportion to the voivod share of program participants. 
After the participant samples were selected, the observable exogenous characteristics of the 
groups selected were examined. The comparison group samples were drawn from the population 
of registered unemployed by matching persons in each of the ALP participant samples to the 
most similar person from the unemployment register of the same local labor office. Separate 
comparison group samples for each program were selected from among those who registered as 
unemployed within the same time period and never participated in an active labor program.
Table 3 shows that in contrast to a random sample of registered unemployed the 
retraining group is less male, younger, more educated, less likely to be in a blue collar 
occupation, and more likely to be long term unemployed; the public works group is more male, 
younger, and less educated; the intervention works group is more female, younger, less likely to
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be in a blue collar occupation, and more likely to be long term unemployed; and the self- 
employment group is more male, more likely to be of prime working age, more likely to be of 
prime working age, more likely to be vocationally educated, and slightly less likely to be long 
term unemployed. Sizes for ALP participant samples are listed in Table 3.24
Net impact estimates
Net impact estimates of ALP effects were computed for Hungary and Poland on 
employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation outcome measures. To provide an 
overview of the findings estimates on five different outcome measures are presented in Table 4:25
EMPLOYED - Ever reemployed in a non-subsidized job or self-employment
EMPLNOW - Employed in a non-subsidized job or self-employment on the survey date 
EARNNOW - Average monthly earnings on the current job on the survey date 
UCMONTHS - Months of UC collected 
UCPAY - Amount of UC collected
24The matched pairs comparison group sample sizes are: 2,885 for retraining, 1,174 for 
public works, 2,410 for intervention works, and 700 for self-employment. Contrasting these with 
the participant samples on observable characteristics revealed the strategically selected 
comparison samples to be well matched to the participant samples. The matched comparison 
samples are therefore ideal for computing net impacts while controlling for non-random 
participant selection into ALPs.
"Complete results are reported in O'Leary (199 8 a, 1998b). The ALP net impact 
estimates reported here were computed in ES interaction models by ordinary least squares. 
These are linear probability models with well known deficiencies when the dependent variable is 
binary as are EMPLOYED and EMPLNOW. Since the mean values of these outcomes are far 
from the extremes of 0 and 1, the non-linear method of logit did not result in significantly 
different marginal effect estimates. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991, p. 260) explain this result.
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Net impact estimates are examined for the following four classes of programs: retraining, 
public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment. The discussion of each program includes 
review of subgroup estimates which are reported in Table 5 for Hungary and Table 6 for Poland, 
and findings concerning the influence of different aspects of ALPs as summarized in Table 7 for 
Hungary and Table 8 for Poland.
Retraining
For Hungary it was possible to separately analyze the net impacts of individual and group 
retraining. Individual retraining resulted in 11 percentage points more people getting back into a 
non-subsidized job or self-employment, and 9 percentage points more being in such a job on the 
survey date.26 The fact of continued employment through the survey date suggests that the effect 
of retraining is somewhat durable. There was no significant impact on average monthly earnings 
in the job held on the survey date. Participation hi individual retraining was estimated to reduce 
UC receipt by 0.68 months and decrease payments by $43.27 As seen in Table 5, there were no 
distinct differences by gender, age education or occupation group. While not significantly
26O'Leary (1998a) reports that the unadjusted impact estimates are very close to the 
adjusted results for individual retraining in Hungary. This is at odds with results from studies 
based on samples drawn in 1992 and 1993 where the unadjusted impact estimates were far larger 
than the estimates adjusted for observable characteristics (O'Leary, 1997). The convergence in 
estimates could be due to changed labor demand conditions in Hungary, or because ALP 
managers have retreated from their practice of creaming in retraining enrollment.
27Unemployment compensation payments are considered since the beginning of 1996. 
All monetary values are stated in U.S. dollars converted at the average daily exchange rate on 
April 1, 1997. This results in a reasonably accurate value for average monthly earnings reported 
in the first part of 1997, however since both the Hungarian and Polish currencies gradually fell in 
value compared to the U.S. dollar the conversion rule underestimates the monetary values 
involved.
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different from the complementary group, the impact on employment was larger for those who 
personally contributed to the direct cost of individual retraining, for those in retraining 3 months 
or less, and for courses meeting 20 or fewer hours per week.
Group retraining in Hungary resulted in 9 percentage points more people getting into a 
non-subsidized job or self-employment, and 7 percentage points more people being in regular 
non-subsidized employment on the survey date.28 There was no significant impact on earnings in 
the job held on the survey date. Participation in group retraining was estimated to reduce UC 
receipt by 0.50 months and decrease payments by $27 on average per participant. For group 
training there were no distinct differences by gender, age, education, or occupational group. The 
impact on employment appeared larger for those who personally contributed to the direct costs of 
group training. Group retraining between 3 and 12 months duration, or conducted outside of the 
regional retraining centers improved employment rates by a statistically significant margin over 
the complementary groups.29
Retraining in Poland resulted in 12 percentage points more people getting into regular 
non-subsidized employment or self employment, and the same percentage point advantage when 
measured at the survey date. Retraining also produced a $7 gain in average monthly earnings. 
Table 6 reports that retraining was most effective for those who were not long term unemployed
28The net impact estimates reported here which are based on a regression model with ES 
interaction and are positive and much larger than the unadjusted impact estimates reported in 
O'Leary (1998a). Like for individual retraining in Hungary this result is at odds with earlier 
findings for Hungary (O'Leary, 1997), and suggests reverse creaming or proper targeting of 
group retraining to raise the social dividend of public spending.
29In Hungary there is a network often regional retraining centers which were established 
under a World Bank loan. Retraining is also provided by private firms and educational 
institutions under contract with the county labor centers.
21
and those with the least prior work experience. It was also more effective in areas with relatively 
high unemployment. There was no difference in retraining impact by gender, age, education or 
major occupational group. As summarized in Table 8, short-term skill focused retraining was 
found to be most effective, and there was some evidence that retraining provided by private firms 
was more effective. It is better if retraining is provided by an adult education?or other firm 
engaged in normal industrial activity rather than having training provided by an employment 
organization or having another labor-related group serve as the trainer.
Public works
In Hungary the direct job creation program is PSE. Participation in PSE resulted in a 26 
percentage point decline in the proportion getting reemployed in a non-subsidized job or self- 
employment, and a 21 percentage point decline in being in such a job on the survey date.30 The 
net impact on average monthly earnings was $9, but this point estimate was not statistically 
significant. The impacts of PSE on receipt of UC were also not statistically significant being 
-0.19 months and -$9. These negative impacts are more severe than expected based on prior 
evidence about PSE in Hungary.31 A subgroup analysis indicated that PSE participation harmed 
reemployment chances less for women, less for those aged 45 or more, and less for the most
30The regression adjusted net impact estimates indicate that PSE has an even more 
detrimental effect on reemployment prospects than suggested by the unadjusted impact estimates 
(O'Leary, 1998a). This result is at odds with earlier findings that unadjusted and adjusted impact 
estimates are very similar for PSE in Hungary (O'Leary, 1997). The new results suggest that 
many of the PSE participants were job ready at the time of program entry. This probably reflects 
changed labor demand conditions for low skilled workers more than any change in PSE referral 
practices by program managers.
31As reported by O'Leary (1997).
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educated. PSE work which requires manual unskilled labor appears to create the greatest 
hindrance to future employment in a regular non-subsidized job or self employment, while non- 
manual and skilled manual work provides the least impediment. There is no significant 
difference by the industry of activity, but service employment appears to be less detrimental in 
promoting reintegration to the regular work force than employment in other industries.
Public works in Poland had much smaller negative net impacts on reemployment than did 
PSE in Hungary. Public works resulted in a 4 percentage point decline in the proportion who 
were in a non-subsidized job or self-employment on the survey date, and an 8 percentage point 
decline in ever getting into such a job. Public works participation did not have a statistically 
significant effect on average monthly earnings. Participation did raise the average duration of 
UC receipt by 0.93 months during the period observed and did increase UC payments by $103. 
The subgroup analysis of public works impact on reemployment revealed no significant 
differences across subgroups. However, the results suggested that public works is less 
detrimental for women, may actually improve employment prospects for older workers, least 
hinder reemployment for those with less than eight years of formal schooling, might benefit 
those whose previous experience was in a white collar occupation, and may not harm those who 
were not long-term unemployed. There was some evidence that short-term public works 
hindered future labor market success less thari did a longer term involvement, and strong 
evidence that public works provided by private firms was more effective. It is better for 




The wage subsidy for long term unemployed in Hungary is estimated to have negative net 
impacts on reemployment, lowering the proportion getting into a non-subsidized job or self- 
employment by 11 percentage points, and reduced the proportion in such a position on the survey 
date by 6 percentage points. 32 A subgroup analysis indicated that the wage subsidy benefitted 
employment most among those in areas with moderate unemployment. The subgroup results 
also suggest that wage subsidy impacts did not vary appreciably by gender, age, or prior 
occupational group. The skill level of the wage subsidy job had no significant effect on the 
employment outcome. Among industries where wage subsidies were used, in terms of being in a 
non-subsidized job or self-employment on the survey date, participants were most harmed by 
subsidized jobs in construction or services.
As described above, intervention works in Poland operates much like a wage subsidy 
scheme. However, the net impact estimates for this program are substantially different from 
those for the wage subsidy in Hungary which is targeted to long term unemployed. The 
intervention works program is estimated to increase the probability of being in a normal job on 
the survey date by 24 percentage points, and of ever finding a normal job by 26 percentage 
points. The program did not have a statistically significant effect on average monthly earnings. 
A subgroup analysis of intervention works revealed significantly larger employment gains for
32For the wage subsidy in Hungary, controlling for observable characteristics and the use 
of the ES was important in estimating net impacts. There is strong evidence that employers were 
quite selective in choosing the best candidates for wage subsidies. The unadjusted impact 
estimates were large and positive (O'Leary, 1998a). Together with the negative and significant 
net impact estimates, this suggests that many workers whose wages were subsidized could have 
gained reemployment without public subsidy. This may be due to intentional creaming by either 
employers or program managers. The deadweight loss is sizeable.
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females, those with less than some higher education, those who are not long-term unemployed, 
and those without prior work experience. The program also has a tendency to be of more benefit 
to older workers. Subsidized jobs under intervention works frequently last either 6 or 12 months. 
The optimal duration appears to be 6 months, with shorter rather than longer duration 
involvement more favorable to reemployment in a regular non-subsidized job or self- 
employment. It also appears that having worked on an intervention works job outside the 
national government boosts the reemployment in a non-subsidized job or self-employment more. 
The best industry observed was health care.
Self-employment
Self-employment assistance in Hungary raised the probability of getting into a non- 
subsidized job or self-employment by 14 percentage points, and raised the chance of being in 
such a position on the survey date by 14 percentage points. 33 It should be noted that assistance to 
the self employed in the participant sample ended during or before the third quarter of 1996. 
Since the survey was conducted in the first quarter of 1997, the follow-up observation occurred
33The employment outcome for participant and comparison group samples included both 
a non-subsidized job and non-subsidized self employment. Restricting the comparison group 
outcome to only self-employment yielded comparison groups too small, and including any non- 
subsidized employment is a reasonable broadening for self-employment assistance recipients.
The net impact estimates presented are from regression models with ES interaction. 
Deleting the ES interaction in estimation yields nearly the same point estimates, but much lower 
standard errors and a high degree of statistical significance since few in the sample used the ES. 
The estimates given in Table 4 for these parameters may be regarded as statistically significant.
The unadjusted impact estimates were significantly larger than the adjusted estimates 
reported here, suggesting that many of those provided self-employment assistance would have 
gained reemployment without the assistance. As Wandner (1992) points out in a cross-country 
survey of European self-employment, only a small share of the unemployed are deemed capable 
of such an undertaking. Therefore creaming may be inherent in any self-employment program.
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relatively soon to fairly judge business survival. 34 The net impact on average monthly earnings 
was -$26. This large negative impact on earnings may reflect a reluctance for full disclosure to 
public authorities as part of a tax avoidance strategy. There also was a large reduction in 
measured UC duration and payments. However, this could simply be an artifact of the self- 
employment program which essentially relabels UC and extends payments by 6 months. A clear 
benefit of self-employment was that 17.6 percent of those receiving assistance hired at least one 
other worker for their enterprise. Indeed one successful recipient claims to have hired 12 
workers. The mean number of workers employed by those who did hire someone was 1.75 
employees, and the mean hired among all assistance recipients was 0.31. Furthermore, about 
half of all those hired were previously unemployed. The net impact on average monthly earnings 
was -$26. A sub-group analysis indicated that self-employment assistance boosted 
reemployment rates most among those 45 years of age and older, and those in high 
unemployment areas. Among industries the least fertile place for self-employment yielding 
lasting effects was services. There was not a significant difference in employment outcomes for 
those who started individual versus partnership activities.
Self-employment in Poland is estimated to increase the probability of getting into a non- 
subsidized job or non-subsidized self-employment by 29 percentage points and to raise the 
chance of being in such a job on the survey date by 27 percentage points. Those moving into 
self-employment reported dramatic gains in average monthly earnings which amounted to $69, 
and also dramatic reductions in the duration and amount of UC benefits drawn. Self-
34For small business start-ups in the United States, Birch (1987, p. 18) estimated that "For 
every group of companies that open their doors, approximately half will last five years, 38 
percent will be around after ten years, and 31 percent will survive 15 years."
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employment loan recipients drew less in UC benefits by a staggering 3.65 months and $258. 
Among those receiving a self-employment loan 26.7 percent hired at least one other worker. One 
loan recipient reported hiring 73 workers. The mean number of workers hired by those who did 
employ someone was 3.13 employees. The mean hired among all loan recipients was 0.83 
employees. Self-employment provided a particular reemployment advantage for females, those 
whose previous experience was in a blue-collar occupation, those with no prior registered 
unemployment, and those with a positive but small amount of prior work experience. In terms of 
positive reemployment outcomes the worst type of enterprise to initiate with self-employment 
assistance appears to have been manufacturing or construction. Like in Hungary, it must be 
remembered that the period for observing reemployment success of the self-employed in Poland 
is relatively short. The sample in Poland includes those who received loans in 1993 and 1994. 
Since the program provides a 50 percent loan forgiveness after 24 months survival, that is 24 
months with no UC benefit, and the follow-up survey was done in early 1997 some loan 
recipients had only just passed their loan forgiveness date when interviewed. This program 
design feature most certainly affected results during the period of observation in Poland.
Summary
To evaluate the effectiveness of active labor programs (ALPs) in Hungary and Poland 
more than 27,000 follow-up interviews were conducted in early 1997 by employees of local 
labor offices with persons in ALP participant and comparison group samples. Net impact 
estimates revealed what can be expected from each of the alternative interventions in terms of 
employment, earnings, and savings on unemployment compensation payments. Four types of
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ALP were examined: retraining, public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment assistance. 
The evaluation was mainly financed by the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of International 
Labor Affairs, the European Training Foundation, and the W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research. In kind contributions were provided by the national labor offices in 
Hungary and Poland. The project was coordinated by the World Bank. The national labor 
organizations of Hungary and Poland collaborated fully in producing the impact estimates, and in 
the process acquired skills which will permit future scientific evaluation of employment 
programs.
Wide ranging differences were observed between the demographic composition ALP 
samples and the general population of unemployed. Program effects were therefore computed as 
net impact estimates controlling for systematic sample selection using observable characteristics 
including information on job search assistance from the employment service. The net impact 
estimation procedure eliminated any deadweight loss when measuring results from ALP 
participation.
Retraining was found to significantly increase the reemployment rate in both Hungary 
and Poland. Return to a non-subsidized job or self-employment increased by a net 9 to 12 
percentage points among retraining participants. Focused short term skill training delivered by 
private contractors appeared to be most effective. Retraining did not provide a particular 
advantage in getting the long term unemployed back to work. Earlier evaluations found evidence 
that creaming, whereby mostly the job ready are selected for participation, was generally 
practiced by retraining managers in Hungary. Creaming is costly to society because ALP
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resources are spent on people who could get reemployed without government assistance. The 
present evaluation found no evidence that managers of retraining practice creaming.
Public works is not intended to rapidly reintegrate unemployed back into non-subsidized 
jobs. The main aims are income transfer, arresting the deterioration of work place behaviors, and 
some contribution to social services or public infrastructure. It is not surprising that negative net 
impacts on reemployment in non-subsidized work were found. Nonetheless some findings based 
on the reemployment outcome have been useful in shaping policy. Publicly created jobs 
appeared to be much more of a detriment to getting reemployed in a non-subsidized job in 
Hungary (-26 percentage points) than in Poland (-8 percentage points). The population sub 
groups in Hungary who were least hindered by such a temporary job were recent school leavers 
and those forced out of their earlier job. In Poland, public works least harmed reemployment in a 
non-subsidized job among older workers, those with a general secondary education, and those in 
low unemployment areas. Most importantly in Poland there was a large positive impact on 
getting into a non-subsidized job (10 percentage points) when the project was run by a private 
company, while the impact was negative (-5 percentage points) when run by a government 
agency.35 This last result has been particularly influential in reshaping the management of 
public works in Poland. Private management of projects also reduces the chance of fiscal 
substitution whereby government agencies finance regular staff positions with Labor Fund 
money.
35This finding is consistent with those of Disney and Carruth (1992) who reported that in 
Germany and the U.K. the transition to regular employment was more likely to be made by 
public works employees if their project was run by a private enterprise rather than a government 
agency.
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Wage subsidies in Hungary are targeted toward long term unemployed and were found to 
be detrimental to reemployment, lowering the proportion in non-subsidized jobs on the survey 
date by 6 percentage points. Furthermore, combined with the large positive unadjusted impact 
estimates this suggests that many participants could have gained reemployment without public 
subsidy. So that the deadweight loss for the wage subsidy in Hungary is sizeable. On the other 
hand the wage-subsidy-like program in Poland, intervention works which is mainly operated by 
private contractors, raised the proportion in non-subsidized jobs on the survey date by 24 
percentage points. The commonality of response in Poland between intervention works and 
public works run by private companies is notable. Also significant is the large reductions in the 
duration and amount of unemployment compensation (UC) which result from intervention works 
participation in Poland. These many positive outcomes make programs like intervention works a 
particularly appealing reemployment program.
Self-employment yielded the most favorable set of impacts of the four ALPs in both 
countries. However, many of those receiving self-employment assistance probably would have 
gained reemployment without government assistance. UC savings were the biggest by a large 
margin, and impacts on employment outcomes were large and positive. In Poland there were 
also large and positive earnings impacts. A negative estimated earnings impact in Hungary may 
have been due to a reluctance for full disclosure to tax authorities. In both countries there were 
appreciable secondary employment effects of between 0.31 and 0.83 additional workers per 
person given self-employment assistance. Among subgroups self-employment appeared to be 
more effective in high unemployment areas in Hungary, among females in Poland, outside of 
services industries in Hungary, and outside of manufacturing and construction in Poland.
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Conclusion
The collection of active and passive labor programs in place in Hungary and Poland to 
support the development of competitive labor markets is impressive. This report presents a net 
impact analysis of four important active labor programs (ALPs) in each of the countries: 
retraining, public works, wage subsidies, and self-employment. These programs are 
administered in a decentralized way by the provinces which adhere to rules established by 
national law with funding provided mainly from the central government budget. They are 
discretionary programs and therefore subject to dramatic year-to-year changes in funding. Other 
active labor programs are operated in both Hungary and Poland on a centralized basis. Usage of 
these supplementary measures, which mainly address problems in high unemployment areas, 
fluctuate more widely over time.
The evidence presented in this report is useful for developing an economic justification 
for public expenditure on ALPs. However the decision to pursue programs for labor market 
support also has a political dimension. During a period of dramatic change in conditions of 
employment security, such programs are more imperative than option. The rules for return on 
investment cannot be simply applied to such matters. Social stability is a difficult value to 
quantify.
In assessing the net benefits of an ALP it is important to be clear about the perspective 
taken. Things may be judged from social, government, program, and individual views. It is 
impossible to properly measure all factors which bear on such computations, these include things 
like the value of projects completed under public works and the value of time spent in retraining. 
Nonetheless, the main elements for such computations can be measured. A summary of these are
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presented in Table 9. The first three columns repeat information from Table 4 on employment 
earnings, and unemployment compensation payment. The last column lists the per participant 
cost for providing each program in 1996.
It is unlikely that any of the ALPs yields a positive return on investment during the period 
of observation. Indeed the alternatives should be examined to determine which are the least 
costly for returning the unemployed to work. Skill retraining for the unemployed as 
administered in Hungary and Poland appears to be a good bargain, and the evidence is that these 
programs are well targeted to yield a high social value. Public works is not generally a path back 
to non-subsidized work, somehow though spending more per participant and operation by private 
employers appears to be an advantage. The wage subsidies targeted to the long term unemployed 
are costly and yield no easily measurable benefits, while more generally provided wage subsidies 
for jobs at private employers offer real benefits albeit at higher costs. Finally, self-employment 
assistance while appropriate for only a small share of all unemployed, does provide a realistic 
prospect of reemployment for some.
Aside from the net impacts, ALPs have a direct effect of easing the labour market 
tensions because of the simple fact that those who are participating in ALPs are not counted as 
unemployed during their participation. In Hungary during the past few years such participation 
has reduced measured unemployment by 2 percentage points below what it would be otherwise. 
Furthermore, while ALP participation does not always immediately result in stable 
reemployment, for individual program participants the experience is at a minimum an 
interruption in an otherwise continuous spell of unemployment.
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The kind of mixed net impact assessment reported here is common for active labour 
programmes, and should be expected given the range of difficulties involved. In times when 
unemployment is high and the demand for labour is low as currently in transition countries, 
uniformly high net impacts from ALPs would be suspect. The range of results found highlights 
the importance of carefully assessing active labour programmes so that public funds .can be 
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Table 1. The unemployment rate and employment programme spending on active and passive labour 
programmes in Hungary and Poland, 1990-96
Unemployment rate (%)
Price index (previous year = 100)
Spending on ALPs1 and PLPs2 (million 
forints)






Share of spending on PLPs2
Unemployment rate (%)
Price index (previous year = 100)
Spending on ALPs 1 and UC3 (million 
zloty)
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Other ALPs 1


























































































































































1 Active labour programmes; 2 Passive labour programmes; 3 Unemployment compensation. 
Sources: National Labour Centre, Budapest, and National Labour Office, Warsaw
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Table 2. Composition of the ALP samples contrasted with that of the comparison group, in Hungary____  
comparison Individual Group Public service Wage Self- 
group retraining retraining employment subsidies employment
Male respondent
Aged s 30 
Aged 3 1-44 
Aged 45+
8 years of schooling 
Vocational education




























































* Difference from the full comparison group is statistically significant at the 90 per cent level in a two-tailed test. 
** Difference from the full comparison group is statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test.
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Aged < 30 
Aged 30-44 
Aged 45+
8 years of schooling 
Vocational education 
General secondary education 
Some higher education
Blue-collar occupation 




























































Difference from the random sample of unemployed is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test.
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Table 4. Net impact of ALPs on employment, earnings, and unemployment compensation, in Hungary and 
Poland____________________________________________________________























































** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test
1 Ever re-employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment
2 Employed in an unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date
3 Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
4 Months of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996
5 Amount of unemployment compensation collected since January 1996, in US$ at exchange rate of US$1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints or 
3.068 Polish zloty, on 1 April 1997, approximately the survey date_______________________________________
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Table 5. Estimates of net impact of ALPs by subgroup on whether participants were employed in an 
unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date, in Hungary
Individual 
retraining
Male respondent 0.086** 
Female respondent- 0.087**
Aged < 30 0.081** 
Aged 30-44 0.076** 
Aged45+~ 0.126**
8 years of schooling 0.086** 
Vocational education 0. 1 0 1 * *
General secondary education 0.066** 
Some higher education- 0.098
White-collar occupation 0.05 1 
Blue-collar occupation~ 0.098**
Long-term unemployed 0.084** 
Not in long-term unemployment- 0.087**
Area of low unemployment 0.066* * 
Area of medium unemployment 0.087** 








































































* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
# Significantly different from the reference group at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
## Significantly different from the reference group at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
~ Reference group for subgroup differences; excluded from estimation
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Table 6. Estimates of net impact of ALPs by subgroup on whether participants were employed in an 
unsubsidized job or in self-employment on the survey date, in Poland
Male respondent- 
Female respondent
Aged ^ 30 
Aged 3 1-44 
Aged 45+-
8 years of schooling or less 
Vocational secondary education~ 








Not in long-term unemployment-
Work experience = zero 
Work experience <. 3 years 
Work experience > 3 years- 
Work experience 2 1 1 years- 1
Area of low unemployment 





























































































* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
# Significantly different from the reference group at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
## Significantly different from the reference group at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
  Reference group for subgroup differences; excluded from estimation
1 For public works and self-employment, work experience of 4-10 years inclusive._____________
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Table 7. Impact of various features of ALPs on whether participants were employed in an unsubsidized job or 
in self-employment on the survey date, in Hungary




































Duration of ALP 
< 1 month 
1 < 3 months 
3 < 6 months 
6< 12 months 
12+months
Organized by
Regional centre, over 20 hrs/w 
Regional centre, 20 hrs/w or less 
Other, over 20 hrs/w 
Other, 20 hrs/w or less










Type of enterprise 
Individual enterprise 
Partnership or other
* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
a Significantly different from the first category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
b Significantly different from the second category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 






















Table 8. Impact of various features of ALPs on whether participants were employed in an unsubsidized job or 
in self-employment on the survey date, in Poland________________________________








Ownership of provider 
Public
Private
Category of provider 
Adult education



































* Statistically significant at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
a Significantly different from the first category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
b Significantly different from the second category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test 
c Significantly different from the third category at the 90 per cent confidence level in a two-tailed test
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Table 9. Elements in a cost-benefit analysis of ALPs in Hungary and Poland


















































** Statistically significant at the 95 per cent level in a two-tailed test
'Employed in an unsubsidized job or in selfemployment on the survey date
2Average monthly earnings from the current job on the survey date (US$)
'Amount of unemployment compensation since January 1996, in US$ at 1 April 1997 exchange rate
4Average cost per participant in 1996 in the provinces studied at exchange rate of US$1.00 = 175.75 Hungarian forints or 3.068 Polish zloty, on
1 April 1997, approximately the survey date
5This cost includes the full loan amount; 50 per cent write-off on most loans if remainder repaid within certain time limit____________
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